David Winch, Forensic Accountant &
Expert Witness
When a defendant has been charged with more than one offence he may
wish to offer a guilty plea to some of the counts he faces if the
remaining counts against him will not be pursued. Those counts which
are not pursued might be dealt with in one of two ways. The prosecution
could state in court that they propose to offer no evidence on those
counts. The judge will then formally record ‘not guilty’ verdicts in
relation to them.
Alternatively the prosecution could invite the judge to agree that
the counts are to be ‘left to lie on the file’ without any verdict being
entered. That means that the prosecution may only revive and proceed
on those counts in wholly exceptional circumstances.
So it would appear that, in practical terms, the outcome is the same –
those allegations have been disposed of and the defendant will no
longer face prosecution for them. But in any subsequent confiscation
proceedings there is, I venture to suggest, a very important difference
between these two methods of disposal.
Case law
Case law indicates that where a defendant has been formally acquitted
of a count it is not open to the prosecution to suggest, in
confiscation proceedings based on his conviction on one or more other
counts on the same indictment, that the defendant was in fact guilty of
that offence. To do so would imply that the court has ‘got it wrong’ so
far as the acquittal is concerned.
In
R (on the application of Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18
the Supreme Court held at paragraph [111] “the principle that is
applied is that it is not open to the state to undermine the effect of
the acquittal”. Similarly the Supreme Court held in
Gale v Serious Organised Crime Agency [2011] UKSC 49
at paragraph [115] “in all proceedings following an acquittal the court
should be astute to ensure that nothing that it says or decides is
calculated to cast the least doubt upon the correctness of the
acquittal”.
In this respect the UK Supreme Court judgments are consistent with
the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Geerings v The Netherlands [2007] ECHR 191. In the
Geerings
case a confiscation order made against Mr Geerings following his
conviction of certain offences was assessed, in part, on the basis that
he was in fact also guilty of other offences of which he had been
acquitted in the same proceedings. The European Court held that this
had violated his Article 6(2) right to the presumption of innocence.
In contrast where counts have been left to ‘lie on the file’ I
suggest that it is open to the prosecutor, in confiscation proceedings,
to suggest that the defendant is in fact guilty of those offences.
Indeed in a ‘
criminal lifestyle‘
confiscation the defendant may find that the burden will rest upon him
to satisfy the court, on the balance of probabilities, that he is
not guilty of those offences.
Simon’s case
An example from a recent case in which I was involved as an
expert witness may underline
the point. The defendant, let’s call him Simon, ran a plant hire
business. His premises were raided by the police who examined 91 items
of plant which he hired out. They found 39 of these items to have been
stolen property. Simon was charged with 39 counts of ‘handling’ under
s22 Theft Act 1968
on the basis that he knew or believed these items to be stolen. Simon
denied that he knew or believed the items to be stolen but, shortly
before the matter came for trial, he pleaded guilty to 9 of the 39
counts and all parties agreed to the remaining 30 counts being left to
‘lie on the file’.
Simon was subsequently subject to confiscation on the basis that he had a ‘
criminal lifestyle‘
having been convicted of more than 3 offences and having obtained from
them a benefit of at least £5,000 (which was not disputed). In the
confiscation proceedings the prosecution asserted that the income
generated from the hiring out of all 39 items was benefit of Simon’s
criminal conduct. The defence contended that the benefit should be
assessed only by reference to the income from the hire of the 9 items in
relation to which Simon had been convicted.
The judge heard oral evidence from Simon regarding his state of
knowledge concerning the 30 items and also heard oral evidence from
other witnesses. The judge entirely disbelieved and rejected Simon’s
evidence and based the confiscation order on the income generated from
the hire of all 39 stolen items.
In approaching the matter in the way he did, the judge acted consistently with the recent Court of Appeal judgment in
Bagnall v R [2012] EWCA Crim 677.
It was open to the judge to apply the statutory assumptions which, in
his judgment, Simon had failed to rebut in relation to income generated
from the hire of all 39 stolen items. This did not, in law, amount to a
finding that Simon was guilty of offences of which he had not been
convicted (although it had the same effect in terms of the confiscation
order).
No doubt the outcome of the confiscation would have been
significantly different if Simon had been formally acquitted of the 30
counts to which he did not plead guilty. Alternatively, had Simon
insisted, insofar as he was able, that he face trial before a jury on
the 30 counts (and, in my view at least, a defendant has a right to a
fair trial on all the counts with which he has been charged) it is
possible that he would have been acquitted on some or all of those
counts. In a jury trial the burden would have been upon the prosecution
to prove, to the criminal standard, that Simon knew or believed that
each of the items of plant was stolen. As things turned out, acquittals
on any of the counts would have led to a better outcome for Simon in
the confiscation proceedings.
So, for a defendant and his legal team, agreeing to counts being left
to ‘lie on the file’ may be a less attractive option than it appears.